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Introduction 
 
The majority of the literature dealing with terrorism and the Internet focuses on 
cyberterrorism. In particular, it focuses on the vulnerability of critical information 
infrastructure(s) to cyber attack. Consistently alarmist in nature, many of these texts 
focus on the potentially disastrous consequences of a successful future cyberterrorist 
attack1 while skipping blithely over the proven role played by the Internet in a vast 
amount of current terrorist activity.2 The fact remains that despite the presence of 
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many terrorist organisations online, worldwide no act of cyberterrorism has ever yet 
occurred. The point is not that cyberterrorism cannot happen or will not happen, but 
that it has not happened yet. Given this fact, the state of research into terrorist group’s 
very real online presence is curious on two counts. First, only a tiny number of 
political scientists, international relations scholars, or even those whose exclusive 
focus is the study of terrorism, have researched terrorist Web sites.3 As a cursory 
glance in any bookstore or library reveals, the majority of what passes for knowledge 
about the intersection of terrorism and the Internet is based on opinion and 
impression, not on social science theory or empirical investigation. Further, most of 
the research that is available is focused on specific groups and dispersed across space 
and time such that meaningful synthesis is next to impossible.  
This chapter explores the primary materials provided by modern terrorists in 
the form of their Web sites, in an effort to map the virtual terrorist presence, with a 
view to highlighting the increasing role of soft power in our information society and 
the way in which Internet-savvy terrorist groups have wielded this.   
Terrorist Web sites have not yet been the subject of any sustained academic 
investigation. A majority of the research and analysis pertaining to the Internet and 
Web sites as political tools has focused on the power of transnational advocacy 
groups, such as Green Peace, Amnesty International and other civil society actors, and 
their ability to harness the power of international communications technologies to 
forward their goals.4 Much less attention has been paid to those groups that compose 
‘uncivil society,’ particularly terrorist groups. This may be due to a number of factors, 
including the difficulty associated with fitting groups that employ violence into the 
various frameworks devised to categorize social movements, and a certain ‘feel good 
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factor’ that imbues the work of scholars concerned with issues of transnationalism and 
international advocacy.  
An alternative reason why the academic community has essentially ignored 
Web sites maintained by terrorist organizations may be that scholars doubt the 
efficacy of the Internet as a political tool. Walter Laqueur, a respected figure in 
terrorism studies, made the following observation in 1999: 
 
No amount of e-mail sent from the Baka Valley to Tel Aviv, from Kurdistan to 
Turkey, from the Jaffna peninsula to Colombo, or from India to Pakistan will 
have the slightest political effect. Nor can one envisage how in these 
conditions virtual power will translate into real power.5 
 
This statement is doubly startling when one considers that a few lines previously 
Laqueur admits that audiocassettes smuggled into Iran played a key role in the 
Khomeini revolution. In more recent times, numerous civil society actors have 
conducted successful campaigns via the Internet that have had significant political 
effects. For example, e-mail was credited with halting a US banking plan aimed at 
combating money laundering; the Nobel Prize-winning International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines, which successfully lobbied for a treaty stopping the use, production, 
stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, coordinated it’s activities via the Net; 
the Web site MoveOn.org, best known today for its efforts to mobilize opponents of 
both George W. Bush and the Iraq war, has attracted over two million subscribers to 
join its e-mail list and has instituted a US-wide TV advertising campaign paid for by 
online donations. In each case ‘virtual’ or ‘soft’ power was translated into ‘real’ 
power, whether financial, legal, or otherwise. These and similar successes have not 
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gone unnoticed by terrorist groups and their supporters who realize that establishing a 
meaningful virtual power-base is reliant on a well-designed Web site that performs 
effectively.  
This chapter focuses on four core issues surrounding the functioning and 
effectiveness of terrorist Web sites: 
 
• Which terrorist groups are online? 
• What are the functions of terrorist Web sites? 
• What are the contents of these Web sites? 
• Are some terrorist sites more effective than others? 
 
 
Which Terrorist Groups are Online? 
 
In 1998, it was reported that approximately half of the thirty terrorist groups 
designated as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ under the US Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 operated Web sites. Today, virtually every 
known terrorist group--there are approximately seventy operating worldwide--has an 
online presence, and many groups are the subjects of more than one site. Nationalist-
separatist groups that maintain Web sites include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
Armata Corsa (the Corsican Army), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the 
Philippines, and various Chechen organisations. Islamist groups also maintain a 
prominent online presence with sites representing al-Qaeda, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 
Ansar al Islam (Supporters of Islam), the Kashmiri Hizb-ul Mujehideen, the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, and others. 
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Both traditionally conceived right-wing and left-wing terrorist organisations are also 
present on the Web. Left-wing terror group sites include those maintained by the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Turkish-based Popular 
Democratic Liberation Front (DHKP/C), Peru’s Tupac Amaru, and the Japanese Red 
Army (JRA). Right-wing terrorist groups who maintain an online presence--though 
much less numerous than their leftist counterparts--include the Colombian National 
Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), 
among others.6 A relatively comprehensive list of all such sites, both official and 
unofficial, is maintained by an individual in the United States and is available online.7 
 
 
Conceptualising Terrorist Activity on the Web 
 
The traditional mass media has long been a tool used by terrorists to pursue their 
goals. This is because terrorism has always been about communication. In fact, 
“Without communication there can be no terrorism.”8 Each new advancement in 
communication technology has resulted in new opportunities for terrorists to publicize 
their positions: from Marxist revolutionaries such as Brazil’s Carlos Marighela’s 
advice to his comrades to use photocopying machines to produce large numbers of 
pamphlets and manifestos to Hizbollah’s establishment of it’s Al Manar television 
station in the early 1990s. While seeking to convey a message through their 
‘propaganda of the deed,’ terrorists must also employ written and spoken language in 
an effort to legitimize, rationalize and, ultimately, advertise their actions. Now, thanks 
to the new communications technologies, and the Internet in particular, terrorists are, 
for the first time, equal communication partners in the electronic agora.  
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Rachel Gibson and Stephen Ward identify five key properties of the Internet 
that render it different from traditional media:  
(a) Volume: far larger volumes of information can be transferred easily compared 
with previous modes of communication. 
(b) Speed: the ability to compress data and more space for transmitting data 
decrease the amount of time it takes to exchange information 
(c) Format: the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video means that in-
depth, dynamic, and visually stimulating communication is possible 
simultaneously.  
(d) Direction: the possibilities for two-way interactive communication are greatly 
expanded on the WWW as a result of the greater space and speed, but also due 
to the enhanced horizontal or lateral links arising out of hypertext linkage 
between sites.  
(e) Individual Control:  the opening up of control over the direction in the sending 
and receiving of information means that power is decentralised to the 
individual user who has the choice of not only what to view, but also what to 
publish.  
“In summary, therefore, Web-based communication has the potential to be a more 
immediate, dynamic, in-depth, interactive, and unedited process than is possible in 
conventional media.”9  
What are terrorist groups attempting to do by gaining a foothold in 
cyberspace? In a recent report for the United States Institute of Peace entitled 
WWW.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet (2004), Gabriel Weimann 
highlights the advantages offered by the Internet to terrorists: ease of access; the 
ability to evade regulation, censorship, and other forms of government control; 
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potentially huge audiences with a global spread; anonymous intra-group 
communication; rapid transfer of information; inexpensive development and 
maintenance of Web sites; a multimedia environment; and the ability to shape 
coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use the Web as a source 
for reporting.10 Weimann goes on to identify eight different ways in which terrorists 
currently use the Internet, which are premised upon the distinctive properties of the 
Internet as identified by Gibson and Ward above. These are: psychological warfare, 
publicity and propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment and mobilisation, 
networking, information sharing, and planning and coordination.11 Many of these uses 
rely on a functioning Web site, whether operated by terrorists and/or their supporters 
to engage in propaganda and raise funds or sites operated by others, but used by 
terrorists for data mining or planning and coordination purposes. If we aggregate 
Weimann’s categories, we are left with four major--albeit sometimes overlapping--
functions that terrorist groups might seek to pursue via their Web sites: information 
provision, resource generation, networking, promoting participation.  
 
Information Provision 
 
This refers to efforts by terrorists to engage in publicity, propaganda and, ultimately, 
psychological warfare. The unmediated nature of the Internet, in conjunction with 
high levels of connectivity, renders it a communications medium unlike any other. 
There is a tendency in newspapers and on television for the primary sources of 
political information to be those who represent authority or who are members of the 
existing power structure. The British scholar Stuart Hall distinguishes between these 
‘primary definers’ (e.g. politicians, police spokesmen, government officials), and 
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what he calls ‘secondary definers’ (e.g. political or social activists, ‘reformers,’ 
terrorists) who reside outside the existing power structure. The latter are used much 
less frequently by the media than are primary definers, according to Hall.12 So while 
modern terrorists can manipulate the media into devoting newsprint and airtime to 
their activities, political claims, and demands, the media in turn manipulates the 
terrorists: “The insurgent terrorist messages are transported to the public mainly by 
the media and the message is thereby almost invariably abbreviated, distorted or even 
transformed.”13 Journalists and TV presenters achieve this by playing up the violent 
spectacle at the expense of analysis, in order to attract consumers, thus undermining 
the terrorists’ claim to legitimacy by depicting them as merely violent--oftentimes 
irrational and perhaps even psychotic--and not political.14 With the advent of the 
Internet, however, the same groups can disseminate their information undiluted by the 
media and untouched by government sensors. This can take the form of historical 
information, profiles of leaders, manifestos, etc. But terrorists can also use the Internet 
as a tool of psychological warfare through spreading disinformation, delivering 
threats, and disseminating horrific images, such as the beheading of American 
entrepreneur Nick Berg in Iraq and US journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan via their 
Web sites.15 These functions are clearly improved by the Web’s enhanced volume, 
increased speed of data transmission, low-cost, relatively uncontrolled nature, and 
global reach. 
 
Resource Generation 
 
This refers to efforts by terrorist groups to raise funds for their activities. The 
immediacy and interactive nature of Internet communication, combined with its high-
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reach properties, opens up a huge potential for increased financial donations as has 
been demonstrated by a host of non-violent political organisations and civil society 
actors.16  
 
Networking 
 
This refers to groups’ efforts to flatten their organisational structures and act in a more 
decentralised manner through the use of the Internet, which allows dispersed actors to 
communicate quickly and coordinate effectively at low cost. The Internet allows not 
only for intra-group communication, but also inter-group connections. The Web 
enhances terrorists’ capacities to transform their structures and build these links 
because of the alternative space it provides for discussion and the hypertext nature of 
the Web, which allows for groups to link to their internal sub-groups and external 
organisations around the globe from their central Web site.  
 
Promoting Participation  
 
This refers to groups’ efforts to recruit and mobilise sympathisers to more actively 
support terrorist causes or activities. The Web offers a number of ways for achieving 
this: it makes information gathering easier by offering more information, more 
quickly, and in multimedia format; the global reach of the Web allows groups to 
publicise events to more people; and by increasing the possibilities for interactive 
communication, new opportunities for assisting groups are offered, along with more 
chances for contacting the group directly. Finally, through the use of discussion 
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forums, it is also possible for members of the public--whether supporters or detractors 
of a group--to engage in debate with one another.17  
 The coding scheme described below is designed to address two questions: Are 
terrorist Web sites performing the functions identified above? How well or effectively 
are they performing these functions?18 
 
 
Comparing Terrorist Web Sites: Methodology 
 
Of the thirty-six organisations that currently appear on the US State Department’s list 
of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organisations, fifteen maintain official sites.19 Ten of 
these are available in English, and it is these sites that will be the subject of this 
analysis.20 All ten groups, their countries of origin, and the URLs of their Web sites 
are listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Terrorist Group Web Sites 
 
Terrorist Group Country/Region 
of Origin 
URL of Web Site 
Aleph/ Aum Shinrikyo Japan http://english.aleph.to 
Basque Homeland and 
Liberty (ETA) 
Spain http://www.contrast.org/mirrors/ehj/aehj/aehj.html 
Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) 
Colombia http://www.farc-ep.ch/pagina_ingles/  
Hamas Israeli-Occupied 
Territories 
http://www.hamasonline.com  
Hizbollah Lebanon http://www.moqawama.tv/page2/main.htm   
Kach/KahaneChai Israel, USA  http://www.kahane.org/home.html  
Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
Sri Lanka http://www.eelamweb.com 
New People’s Army 
(NPA) 
Philippines http://www.philippinerevolution.org 
Kurdish Workers Party 
(PKK)/Kongra-Gel 
Turkey http://www.kongra-gel.org/ 
Sendero Luminoso Peru http://www.csrp.org 
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The content analysis of the sites closely follows the coding scheme developed 
by Rachel Gibson and Stephen Ward in their article ‘A Proposed Methodology for 
Studying the Function and Effectiveness of Party and Candidate Web Sites,’ which 
appeared in the Social Science Computer Review in 2000. Although Gibson and Ward 
focus on political party and election candidate Web sites, they foresee their scheme as 
having broader applicability to the sites of other political actors such as, they say, 
“Internet groups, municipal governments, and civic or community-based pro-
democracy advocates.”21 Gibson and Ward do not specifically refer to terrorist 
organisations; nonetheless, their general schema was judged to be applicable to these 
sites also.  
Gibson and Ward’s coding scheme seeks to gather evidence pertaining to basic 
questions applicable to all political Web sites: a.) what the purpose(s) of the sites are 
and b.) how effectively they deliver their contents. The scheme facilitates the 
comparison of sites based on indicators for information and communication flows and 
those for site delivery.  
 
Function 
 
To assess functionality, the coding scheme was organised around Web sites’ broad 
direction of information and communication flow (ICF). Four categories of ICF are 
identified: downward, upward, lateral (inward or outward), and interactive. The first 
three categories of ICF are unidirectional (i.e. communication is predominantly one-
way); downward from the organisation to the individual user, upward from the user to 
the organisation, outward from the organisation to other bodies, or inward to internal 
groupings. The latter two flows may be described as lateral. Interactive ICFs are two-
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way or multidirectional contacts between groups and individuals whereby there is 
input from one side (usually the user) with the expectation of producing a response 
from the other side. Transactional communications such as donating, where the 
exchange is non-substantive and one-way, are considered to constitute an upward 
rather than an interactive ICF. Gibson and Ward draw a distinction between 
asynchronous or sequential interaction and synchronous or real-time exchanges within 
the category of interactive ICF. As a result of that distinction, which is maintained 
here, a search engine was considered an asynchronous interactive mode of 
communication because a response follows user input after a certain time delay and 
cannot then be subject to modification, while chat rooms are considered synchronous 
interactive modes of communication because they allow for free-flowing exchanges in 
which both inputs and responses are subject to continuous modification.22  
Table 2, ‘Information and Communication Flows on Ten Terrorist Web Sites’, 
is divided into five categories. The first category, ‘Downward Information Flows’, is 
based largely on word counts of the groups’ organisational histories; available 
documents, such as manifestos, etc.; values or ideologies; organisational structures; 
details of operations; leader profiles; negative campaigning; and credit claiming. The 
figures for ‘Newsletters’ and ‘Media releases’ refer to the number of each available on 
the Web site, including archived copies. The availability of a FAQ (i.e. list of 
Frequently Asked Questions) was coded on a simple ‘present/absent’ (1/0) basis. The 
number accompanying the category ‘Targeted pages’ refers to the number of groups 
targeted. The second category is ‘Upward Information Flows’ and refers to the 
presence or absence of donation mechanisms, merchandise for sale, and cookies 
coded on a 1/0 basis. Category three, ‘Lateral/Horizontal Information Flows,’ is 
focused on sites’ link structures, specifically the number of links to groups supportive 
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[Table 2 Could be Inserted Here] of the organisation’s goals (i.e. ‘Partisan Links’), the 
number of general information sites linked to from the terrorist site (i.e. ‘Reference 
Links’), and the number of sub-organisational groups linked to (i.e. ‘Internal Links’). 
The final two categories deal with ‘Interactive Information Flows.’ Category four 
deals with the measure of asynchronous flows (i.e. sequential interaction): the number 
of opportunities available to download logos, posters, and/or screensavers; the 
presence or absence of online art galleries, photo archives or galleries, site searches, 
online games or gimmicks, e-mail lists, and bulletin boards; and the number of 
addresses offered through which to initiate e-mail contact. ‘E-mail feedback’ is 
classified using a four-point scale: presence of e-mail address (1), e-mail requesting 
comments (2), online form/poll (3), no reference (0). The final category, ‘Interactive 
Information Flows: Synchronous’ (i.e. real-time exchanges), identifies the presence or 
absence of chat rooms on the various sites measured on a simple 1/0 basis.  
 
Delivery 
 
The second issue of interest is the success of the terrorist Web sites in delivering the 
postulated functions. This was divided into six basic components: presentation and 
appearance, accessibility, navigability, freshness, and visibility.23 Presentation and 
appearance refers to the ‘glitz factor.’ Gibson and Ward break this component down 
into two sub-categories: flashiness (graphics emphasis) and dynamism (multimedia 
properties). The visual appeal and entertainment value that such properties add to a 
site are considered to make it more effective in delivering its message than, say, 
purely static, plain-text pages. The second component is accessibility. High levels of 
‘glitz’ will be undermined if a site is off-line, takes a long time to load, and various 
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[Table 3 Could be Inserted Here] features and/or pages are inaccessible. Third, 
navigability is an important component of any site. A site that is easy to move around 
and makes it simple to locate particular information communicates its message more 
effectively. Site maps and search engines are factors that assist efficient site 
navigation. Fourthly, freshness is considered key to effective content delivery. Sites 
that are regularly updated will create more interest than those that are not. Stale sites 
deter repeat visits. Finally, measures of visibility of the site on the WWW were also 
included. To deliver its contents, a site must be relatively straightforward to locate. A 
site that is not visible on the Web is failing to deliver its contents.24  
 Table 3, ‘Terrorist Web Site Delivery,’ explores the effectiveness of terrorist 
Web sites in terms of their delivery of the functions stated earlier and utilising the 
categories identified above. ‘Flashiness’ was measured in terms of the total number of 
images appearing on the site, including those contained in photo archives and online 
art galleries. Images appearing on menu bars were counted only once if they were 
fixed as a frame to reappear on each page. The dynamism of sites was measured in 
terms of multimedia content using a four-point scale: moving icons (+1), audio (+2), 
video (+3), live streaming (+4). ‘Freshness’ was classified on a six-point scale 
according to whether the site was updated daily (6), every one to two days (5), every 
three to seven days (4), every two weeks (3), monthly (2), every one to six months 
(1), or hadn’t been updated for more than six months (0). Accessibility was broken 
down into three categories. A count was made of the number of languages, including 
English, in which each site was available. The second category explored the sites’ 
accessibility in principle by measuring whether each site had a no-frame option (+1), 
text-only option (whole site) (+1), text-only documents to download or print (+1), 
foreign language translation (+1). On a more practical level, a simple 1/0 count was 
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used to record whether a site was working or inaccessible on a given date (a) and a 
measure of the English home page in Kb was also recorded at that time (b). The 
number attached to ‘Navigability’ is based on the following calculation: navigation 
tips (+1), number of search engines (+n), home page icon on each page (+1), major 
site area links/menu bar on each page (+1), site map/index (+1). Finally, visibility was 
measured in terms of an advanced Google search measuring ‘links in’ both to the top-
level English-language page (a) and the home page of the group’s main Web site (b), 
if such existed. 
 
 
Analysis of Content 
 
Downward Information Flows 
 
So what is the content of terrorist Web sites? A majority of the sites analysed 
provided historical background on the group and the conflict. This ranged from 
extensive background on Palestine, the land and its people, on the Hamas site, along 
with a brief profile of the group (approx. 500 words) to the Aleph site which 
contained a brief “apology for the Aum Shinrikyo-related incidents” and concise 
details of “drastic reform” of the organisation. The FARC site contained just a small 
amount of historical information and had not been updated to reflect the prominently 
displayed reference to the groups’ fortieth anniversary ‘celebrations’ on their overall 
homepage. This is in contrast to the large amount of background information to be 
found on the NPA site, including text and pictures relating to the thirty-fifth 
anniversary of the group’s founding. Just three sites were devoid of substantive 
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historical content; these were the sites maintained by Hizbollah, Kach, and the PKK. 
Hizbollah maintain a suite of Web sites and extensive background information on the 
group is provided on their Central Press Office site.25 The Kach and PKK sites, on the 
other hand, appeared to be more concerned with current news and events than 
explanation of their positions based on historical events. The lack of background 
information may also point to a presumption on the part of the these sites’ creators 
that visitors to their sites are already familiar with the groups’ origins and the history 
of the respective conflicts.  
 Large amounts of ‘official’ documentation were to be found on the Web sites 
of the leftist organisations. The Web site of Sendero Luminoso contained a section 
entitled ‘Documents of the Communist Party of Peru,’ which included numerous 
reports and declarations of the group’s Central Committee, including the Programme 
of the Communist Party of Peru (1988). The NPA site also contained extensive 
documentation including a section entitled ‘Peace Talks Documents’ (approx. 5,000 
words) and another ‘Recent Statements,’ measuring more than 25,000 words. The 
LTTE site had available copies of two e-books entitled Broken Promises (1995) and A 
Struggle for Justice, the latter of which was advertised as available in hardcopy from 
the Tiger’s International Secretariat in London.  
 A majority of the sites analysed contained sections or documents dealing with 
the groups’ values or ideology. Once again the leftist group--the NPA, Sendero 
Luminoso, PKK, and FAR--devoted large amounts of text to explaining their 
ideological stance. Hizbollah were the only group to make no overt mention of their 
values or ideology on the site analysed, but a number of clear statements on these 
issues were included on their Central Press Office site. Implicitly, however, the 
contents of the site analysed left one in no doubt as to the group’s political and 
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religious stance. Six of the ten sites in the study contained no information on the 
group’s organisational structure. Two sites, those maintained by the NPA and LTTE, 
contained very brief references to their groups’ organisational configuration. As 
mentioned previously, the Aleph site contained information about the groups 
restructuring in the wake of the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. In a 
somewhat similar vein, the FARC site contained quite a detailed rundown of their 
structure in a document that sought to prove the FARC’s right to recognition as 
belligerents pursuant to the Geneva Conventions. In other words, both Aleph and 
FARC provided information on their organisational structure in order to make claims 
for legitimacy.  
Details of terrorist operations were also absent from a majority of the sites 
analysed. Just three groups provided information about their operations. The LTTE 
site provided analysis and photographs of the operation code-named ‘Unceasing 
Waves’ that took place from 1996 to 2000 while the Sendero Luminoso site contained 
a section with text and pictures entitled ‘Reports from the Battlefield.’ The Hizbollah 
site stands out, however, as it contains more than 100,000 words devoted to ‘Military 
Operations.’ This section of the Hizbollah site provides a day-by-day accounting of 
Hizbollah operations from 1997 to the present. The following is a description of 
events on 6 April 2000: 
 
12:00- The IR team of martyrs Mohammad Hassan Ghaddar and Hassan 
Abbas El-Haj attacked Aramta position with the rocket-propelled grenades 
striking its northern fortification and inflicting those who were inside it. 6:35- 
The fighters of Lebanese Resistance Brigades (LRB) targeted Rshaf position 
with the machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades scoring accurate hits. 
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Meanwhile, another group of LRB was falling upon the positions of Hemayed 
and Jamoussa with the suitable arms. Direct goals were chalked up, the 
fighters told.  
 
The Hizbollah site also contains a gallery of photographs of dead ‘martyrs’ numbering 
153. While the Hamas site does not provide text relating to their operations, the site 
does contain fourteen ‘martyrdom videos,’ that is video footage of persons taken 
previous to their engaging in suicide bomb attacks.  
 Just three of the Web sites had newsletters available on their sites. Three 
copies of the newsletter Resistencia were available on the FARC site (Vol.s 26, 29, 
30). Issues of politics, economics, and culture were addressed in each issue. These 
included articles entitled ‘Variations on Plan Colombia,’ ‘Women and Their 
Struggle,’ ‘The Left and the Elections in the Dominican Republic,’ ‘Remembering 
History,’ and ‘Venezuela and Colombia: Two Brother Peoples that are Resisting the 
Imperialist Offensive Together.’ Nine issues of Peru Action and News were available 
in HTML format on the SL Web site. The earliest available issue dated from Summer 
1997 and the most recent available issue appeared in Winter 2002. Each newsletter 
was six to ten pages in length and contained political commentary, statements of the 
Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (CSRP), news, and other information. 
The NPA site had the most extensive collection of newsletters with seventy-nine 
copies available, all were downloadable in both HTML and PDF formats. These dated 
from 1998 to 2004. The site described the newsletter as follows:  
 
Ang Bayan is the official news organ of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines issued by the CPP Central Committee. It provides news about the 
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work of the Party as well as its analysis of and standpoint on current issues. 
AB comes out fortnightly. It is published originally in Pilipino [sic] and 
translated into Bisaya, Ilokano, Waray, Hiligaynon and English. 
  
Subscriptions to Ang Bayan were also available via e-mail. A number of other sites 
also provided e-mail newsletters; these included ETA, Hamas, Kach, and the LTTE. 
None of these newsletters were posted online. 
 Six of the ten sites analysed contained a profile of the group’s leader. Some of 
these, such as those that appeared on the Sendero Luminoso and LTTE sites, were 
quite extensive. The Tamil Tiger leader, Veluppillai Prabhakaran, received extensive 
coverage on the LTTE site. The ‘National Leader’ section of the site contained eight 
interviews with Prabhakaran, ‘Speeches and Messages’ dating from as far back as 
1984, a selection of twenty quotes, a five-second video clip, and a selection of twenty-
seven portrait photographs. The SL leader, Dr. Abimael Guzmán, has been 
imprisoned by the Peruvian government since 1992. The SL site had a large section 
devoted to the activities of the International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life 
of Dr. Abimael Guzmán (IEC) which contained reports, conference proceedings, 
published advertisements, leaflets, and emergency bulletins (1995-2001), while 
elsewhere on the site the text of Dr. Guzmán’s 1992 ‘Speech from a Cage’ was 
reproduced along with accompanying photographs. The Hamas site had a prominent 
link on its top page to a section of the site devoted to memorialising the group’s 
recently deceased leader, Sheikh Achmed Yassin (1938-2004). This section contained 
a biography of Yassin, a selction of quotes, the text of five of Yassin’s speeches, and a 
selection of reactions to his killing from around the globe. The leaders of both Aleph 
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and Hizbollah have their own personal Web sites.26 Neither the ETA nor the FARC 
Web sites identified or discussed the leadership of their organisations.  
 Only two of the ten sites displayed a list of Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQ). The LTTE FAQ related to the group and its origins as opposed to the Web 
site. The list of questions addressed in the FAQ were as follows: 
 
1. What is Tamil Eelam ? 
2. Why did Tamils in Sri Lanka want Tamil Eelam ? 
3. Who is the leader of Tamil Eelam ? 
4. Is Tamil Eelam a communist idea ? 
5. What is the present state of Tamil Eelam ? 
6. Is there religious freedom in Tamil Eelam ? 
7. Can any one travel to Tamil Eelam ? 
8. Who is LTTE ? 
9. Where can I find more information ? 
 
The NPA FAQ (entitled ‘Q&A and located on the menu bar in the top right of each 
page), on the other hand, dealt with technical issues such as downloading and 
unzipping files.  
 Those sites that show a ‘0’ in the ‘Negative Campaigning’ section of Table 2 
were not sites that were free of negative comments regarding their foes. Instead 
negative comments were spread haphazardly throughout these sites and were 
therefore not conducive to measurement in the same way as the negative campaigning 
on some of the other sites that was located in special sections or documents and 
therefore easily identified and measured. The ETA site, for example, contained 
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numerous documents detailing instances of torture, unlawful killing, and multiple 
other human rights abuses allegedly carried out by the Spanish authorities. In a similar 
vein, a large part of the SL site was taken up with criticism of the Peruvian 
government and its officials and their actions against SL members and supporters. The 
Hamas site had a section devoted to ‘Zionist Crimes,’ which contained sixty-one 
separate articles detailing alleged Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians. A sampling of 
article titles: 
 
‘Occupation Forces Fire at Worshipers During Prayer’ 
 
‘Zionist Terrorist Forces Wound Palestinian Baby’ 
 
‘Palestinian Mother Arrested to Blackmail her Wanted Son’ 
 
‘Zionist Terrorist Sniper Paralysis [sic] Palestinian Child’ 
 
The same section of the Hamas site also contained four videos entitled ‘Zionist 
Crimes on Video’ (2 mins 36 secs), ‘Zionist Heli [sic] Bombing Ambulance’ (25 
secs), ‘Zionist Terrorists Beating Child’ (13 secs), and ‘Zionists Terrorise 
Palestinians’ (2 mins 40 secs). 
 By far the largest amount of negative campaigning was carried out on the 
Hizbollah site. A section entitled ‘Israeli Aggressions’ contained hundreds of pages--
over 700,000 word--detailing what appeared to be every act of Israeli aggression 
against the Lebanese since 1998. Below is one of the two reports filed on 15 January 
2002: 
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Eight “Israeli” warplanes violated Lebanese airspace on Monday, a statement 
issued by the Army Command said. The warplanes roared over the country, 
breaking the sound barrier over Beirut and Tripoli in separate sorties.  The 
statement said the planes also swooped over south Lebanon and the Bekaa 
Valley. In a separate statement, the United Nations condemned similar 
violations, which occurred on Sunday after a lull that lasted 10 days. 
According to the statement, Staffan de Mistura, the UN secretary-general’s 
personal representative for southern Lebanon, called upon “Israel” to cease 
such air violations across the UN-delineated Blue Line. 
 
The list of alleged ‘aggressions’ was enormous incorporating not just violations of 
airspace, but torture, unlawful detentions and killings, shootings, bombings, 
deportations, destruction of crops and livestock, beatings of women and children, etc. 
The figure occupying Hizbollah’s entry for ‘Credit Claiming’ in Table 2 is the 
same as the figure for ‘Operations.’ This is because detailing operations was judged to 
be a method of credit claiming. The LTTE entry for ‘Credit Claiming’ is a composite 
figure made up of the figure for ‘Operations’ with the addition of a small amount of 
text (approx. 170 words) that was deemed ‘credit claiming’ and was found linked 
from the ‘LTTE’ icon on the navigation bar at the top of the page. None of the other 
sites analysed were judged to contain significant amounts of overt credit claiming.  
 
 
Upward Information Flows 
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A number of sites solicited financial contributions, but none provided online donation 
facilities, such as a credit card payment option. A number of the sites that requested 
donations also had merchandise for sale. The Kach Web site had numerous requests 
for donations, including a pop-up box on the top page that read as follows: 
 
Make Donations. Israel needs you now more than ever. Support Kahane.org 
the only organisation that has a program that could save Israel. Help us 
legalise the Kahane views in Israel. Only one answer, and it is not fences or 
Oslo. All hostile Arabs who wish to destroy Israel must be removed from 
Israel.  
 
Clicking on the pop-up brought one to a page requesting donations by mail to an 
address in Brooklyn, New York. A telephone number was also provided. The Kach 
site also had a ‘Shopping Centre’. For sale were books, videotapes, audiotapes, t-
shirts, jewellery, Israeli and Kahane Chai flags, and stickers. To purchase, one was 
requested to print out the order form provided and send it, along with a check or 
money order in US$, to the organisation’s Brooklyn, New York address.   
 There was a ‘Contributions’ button located on the top page of the Hizbollah 
site, but this was not operational at the time the site was downloaded for analysis. A 
request for financial contributions was at one time included on Hizbollah’s Al-Manar 
TV site and was accompanied by an account number for a bank in Beirut, Lebanon. 
However, all such requests for contributions now appear to have been scrubbed from 
Hizbollah’s English-language Web sites. None of the Hizbollah sites provide items 
for sale. 
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 The following request for support appeared on the top page of Sendero 
Luminoso’s site: 
 
We're all-volunteer, from our national office staff to our student agitators -- 
we rely on yearly membership dues, material purchases and contributions to 
pay our office rent, phone, postage and printing expenses. If you want to hook 
up with, support and/or join us, please contact us today by phone, fax or postal 
mail. 
 
The ‘Materials’ section of the site offered numerous items for sale including copies of 
the group’s newsletter Peru Action and News, books and pamphlets, VHS videotapes, 
stickers, magnets, t-shirts, pins and buttons, and music CDs. To purchase, one was 
requested to print out the order form provided and send it, along with a check or 
money order in US$ made out to CSRP, to the organisation’s Berkeley, California 
address.  “Volume discounts (up to 40% off) are available to bookstores, teachers, and 
to supporters for use in community outreach.” A calculator was provided at the 
bottom of the page to help with the math.  
 The LTTE’s ‘Online Store’ had similar sorts of items for sale and operated in 
much the same manner as its Kach and SL equivalents, one’s check or money order to 
be posted to an address in Toronto, Canada. The Aleph site had no items for sale, but 
requested that those who wished donate to the charities established to aid victims of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. None of the other Web sites analysed contained 
either requests for donations or merchandise for sale.  
Just two of the ten sites analysed installed cookies.27 They were the Hamas 
and PKK sites.  
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Hyperlink Analysis: Lateral/Horizontal Information Flows 
 
Hyperlink analysis has two measures: the number of links from a site and the number 
of citations linking to a site. The sites analysed addressed special interests and many 
of them were therefore relatively self-contained or ‘close-ended’ meaning that the 
sites generally did not offer extensive external links of either a partisan or non-
partisan nature. The FARC site, for example, was entirely self-contained. It offered no 
external links whatsoever, to the extent that once one had entered the English- 
language section of the site there was no clear way of navigating back to the site’s top 
page as the ‘Home’ link only returned one to the top English-language page. Not all 
of the ten sites analysed were so close-ended, however. The Kach site had the greatest 
number of external links. A majority of these were of a partisan nature and appeared 
in the ‘Friendly Sites’ section of the sidebar. The Kach site also contained six 
reference links, which appeared in the ‘News Network’ section of the sidebar and 
allowed one to link to the newspapers Ha’aretz and the Jerusalem Post, among other 
news sources. The ETA site also had a relatively large number of reference links. 
However, these differed from those appearing on the Kach site in that they were links 
not to current affairs sources, but to sites such as the University of Minnesota Human 
Rights Library, the homepage of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and 
Amnesty International Spain. None of the other sites analysed adopted a similar 
linkage practice. Linking to sites maintained by organisational sub-groups is another 
practice that is not particularly popular among terrorist Web sites. This may be 
because a majority of the groups studied are centralised and their Web presence 
follows the same pattern, but may also stem from the fact that the present research 
focuses upon the groups’ English-language sites and that sub-group sites are only 
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available in indigenous languages. The Aleph site provided links to twelve ‘branch’ 
sites throughout Japan, but these were only available in Japanese. The Hizbollah site, 
on the other hand, provided a links page containing links to the Web sites of some 
twenty-three constituent organisations and various representatives of the organisation. 
These included links to Hizbollah’s Al-Manar satellite television station,28 Al-Nour 
radio,29 and Al-Ahed magazine;30 the homepage of the group’s Secretary General, 
Sayed Hassan Nasrollah; and the homepage of the group’s Deputy Secretary General, 
Sheikh Naim Kasem,31 among others. All of these sites were available in English.  
The number of citations to a site is a measure of the extent to which a site is 
recognised among other sites that deal with the same or similar issues. There are two 
major ways of determining the ‘popularity’ of a site. The first is to measure the 
number of ‘hits’ on or visits to a site. Many pages offer a ‘hit counter’ that records the 
number of times a page has been visited in a given span of time, which number can 
serve as an indicator of the popularity of the page. This was not a viable method in 
this research, however, as none of the ten sites analysed provided such a ‘hit counter.’ 
This approach is severely disadvantaged in any event as it is relatively simple to 
manipulate hit counters. Further, the number shown does not indicate the number of 
visits by different surfers, but is the raw number of hits on the page. The upshot of this 
is that the page may legitimately have been hit a large number of times, but only by a 
small number of regular visitors. The second measure of popularity is to measure the 
number of links to a page from other pages. This was the method employed here. The 
top English-language page of each of the sites along with the sites’ overall home page, 
if such existed, were subjected to a Google ‘Advanced Search’ that allows one to find 
pages that link to specific URLs.32  
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In terms of visibility, some sites were considerably more prominent than 
others (see Table 3). The LTTE site was the most prominent of the ten sites analysed 
with 240 ‘links in’ in January 2004. The Sendero Luminoso, Kach, and ETA sites 
were also fairly prominent during the same period. The top English-language FARC 
page had no direct ‘links in,’ but the group’s Spanish-language homepage acted as a 
cover page for all of the FARC sites and this page had seventy-two ‘links in’ in 
January 2004.  The PKK site showed a very small number of ‘links in’, at just eight, 
but this was due to the structure of the PKK sites, which did not have a cover page 
similar to the FARC site. However, it was possible to navigate from the top Kurdish-
language page, which acted as the site’s overall top page, to the top English-language 
page of the PKK site, and the former had just over forty ‘links in’ in January 2004.  
 
 
Interactive Information Flows 
 
Some sites were highly interactive while others were much less so. Just half of the 
sites analysed provided site search facilities. The Kach site had the most interactive 
features, including a site search. There were posters and flyers for download, 
thousands of photographs (of the Kahane family, protests, parades, funerals, etc.), 
cartoons, jokes, ‘pre-state underground music,’ etc. Contact information was provided 
in the form of an e-mail address and a telephone number. The site also contained an 
online poll. In addition, the Kach site was the only site with an online gaming section, 
which contained five games in which players were supposed to kill Ehud Baraq, 
Shim’on Peres, and Yasir Arafat, amongst others. The aim of one of the games, 
entitled ‘Escape of the Oslo Criminals,’ was described as follows:  
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The year is 2010. Red Alert ! Red Alert ! The insane and dangerous Oslo 
Architects have escaped from their High Security Mental Asylum and are 
heading towards PA! You must stop them from reaching the safety of their 
friends of the PLO and prevent the Israeli citizens from lynching them. 
 
When challenged by a reporter about the games, David Ha’ivri, a Kach member, 
replied: “Each week, Jews are murdered. There are more dangerous things than this 
game. The people who appear in the games gave weapons to the terrorists who murder 
Jews. It’s just a game for children on the Internet.”33  
While none of the sites investigated had chat room facilities, the Kach site was 
the only site with a bulletin board forum. This forum was quite active with 610 
members, 578 separate topics, and over 5,800 posts.  
The Hamas sites had the most items available for download with an archive of 
over 600 screensavers available. Artistic renderings have long been important 
propagandistic devices.34 This is reflected not just in the Hamas screensavers, but the 
online art galleries contained on two of the sites. There are twenty-nine separate art 
works displayed on the SL site, mainly paintings, line drawings, and a small number 
of wall murals. A majority of these were colourful, but crude posters with slogans 
such as ‘Break the chains! Unleash the fury of women as a mighty force for 
revolution!’ and ‘Long live the invincible People's War!’ They were contained in the 
sections ‘Art in Support of the Revolution’ and ‘Revolutionary Art of Peru.’ Many of 
the images were also available as fridge magnets. According to the site’s creators: 
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The art displayed here was mainly created by imprisoned fighters and 
supporters of the PCP. The materials to produce these artworks had to be 
smuggled into the prisons by friends and family. The art has since made its 
way around the world. Many of the artists were killed in the prison massacres 
of June 1986 and September 1992. 
 
The ETA site also had an online art gallery. However, this ‘virtual gallery’ was a great 
deal more sophisticated than its SL equivalent. It contained ten video installations and 
photomontages with audio, accompanied by information about the various artists. One 
of the montages, ‘The Liberation of Navarre,’ featured a naked woman in grainy black 
and white curled in the foetal position, slowly unfolding the length of her body, only 
to find herself in an enclosed space, unable to escape. The gallery also contained a 
montage of photographs of wall murals, from scrawled words to complex paintings, 
accompanied by a short explanation of this practice. 
Five of the sites analysed had online photo galleries or archives. As mentioned 
earlier, the Kach site contained thousands of images of the Kahane family, the 
funerals of murdered Israelis (including the Kahanes), etc. The Hizbollah site 
contained over 150 photos of dead ‘martyrs’ along with an archive of some 200 still-
images from Al-Manar television. The LTTE site also had an extensive photo archive 
containing over 400 images. This archive was searchable by both category and key 
word. Some of the categories included ‘Warrior Statues’ (19 photos), ‘Elephant Pass 
Victory’ (287 photos), ‘Tamil National Leader’ (27 photos), ‘Liberation Tigers’ (49 
photos) and ‘Tiger Operations’ (26 photos). These categories were then divided into 
sub-categories. So, for example, ‘Liberation Tigers’ was divided into ‘Black Tigers’ 
(7 photos), ‘General Photos’ (12), ‘Men Fighters’ (11 photos), ‘Sea Tigers’ (7 
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photos), and ‘Women Fighters’ (12 photos). There was also the facility to send these 
images as e-cards.  
As mentioned, the Kahane site was the only site with an online gaming 
section, but a number of the other sites included less sophisticated games and 
gimmicks. The ETA site contained a clickable map of the Basque country and an 
interactive map of the city of Pamplona, along with real-time information on the 
weather in the area. This site also contained a Basque language primer. The Hamas 
site contained thirteen poems linked from the site’s top page; the NPA site also 
included poetry and two albums of ‘revolutionary’ music. Like the NPA site, both the 
LTTE and SL sites also contained music recordings. The Hizbollah site contained four 
cartoons, while the Kach site contained eighty-four. A majority of the latter were pro-
Israel/anti-Arab, while some twenty-four were anti-Semitic cartoons that had 
appeared in the Arab press. In addition to the musical offerings and e-cards mentioned 
above, the LTTE site also had clickable maps, an online quiz, and a ‘Memory of the 
Day’ section, while the SL site offered free stickers and/or a free newsletter to 
anybody who wished to post the CSRP a stamped, addressed envelope.  
The Aleph site had the most e-mail contacts, with seventeen addresses listed. 
The LTTE provided four separate e-mail addresses, ETA supplied three, and the NPA 
two. The Hamas, Hizbollah, Kach, and FARC sites each provided one e-mail address. 
The PKK and SL sites were the only sites not to provide e-mail contact details. 
Instead, the SL site invited visitors to contact them via postal mail, phone, or fax. In 
addition to e-mail contact details, a number of the sites also provided online forms or 
polls. Sites soliciting such feedback included both SL and the PKK, along with Aleph, 
the NPA, Kach, and FARC. Half of the sites analysed offered visitors the opportunity 
to sign-up for e-mail newsletters. However, these newsletters were not archived on 
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any of the five sites--ETA, NPA, Hamas, Kach, LTTE--that offered this facility and 
so their content remains unknown.  
The least interactive sites were those maintained by FARC and the PKK. 
These sites had no items for download, neither online art nor photo galleries, no 
games or gimmicks, and no e-mail lists. While the PKK site had a search facility, the 
FARC site did not even include this basic feature.  
 
 
Terrorist Web Site Delivery 
 
Half of the sites investigated could be described as ‘glitzy.’ The Kach site, due to its 
very large number of images, was the flashiest of the sites analysed. Other sites 
containing large numbers of images were the Hamas, LTTE, Hizbollah, and Sendero 
Luminoso sites. With just eight images, the FARC site was the least glitzy of all.35 
Regarding the second component of the glitz factor, audio and video were available 
on six of the sites: ETA, NPA, Hamas, Hizbollah, Kach, LTTE, and SL. All of these 
sites, excepting the SL site, also contained moving icons. The Aleph, PKK, and 
FARC sites contained neither audio nor video, nor moving icons.  
 The NPA, Hamas, and Hizbollah sites were the most up-to-date. All three had 
new material added every one to two days. The Aleph and ETA sites, on the other 
hand, had not been updated for more than six months. In fact, most of the material on 
these sites appeared to date from 2001. The remaining sites had been updated at 
various points in the preceding six months.  
 Eight of the sites analysed were available in more than one language. The 
Hamas and LTTE sites were only available in English. However, there are other Web 
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sites associated with these groups available in an assortment of other languages, 
including Arabic and Tamil respectively. The FARC site had the most translations. It 
was available in English, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, and German. 
However, the Portuguese and German sites were inaccessible at the time this research 
was undertaken. The PKK site was available in four languages: English, German, 
Kurdish, and Turkish. The Aleph, ETA, and Kach sites were all available in three 
languages. All three sites were available in English, while the Aleph and Kach sites 
were also available in Russian and the groups’ native languages, Japanese and 
Hebrew respectively. The ETA site, while predominantly in English, also had Spanish 
and Basque language components. Three further sites were available in both English 
and the groups’ native language. These were the NPA (Pilipino), Hizbollah (Arabic), 
and Sendero Luminoso (Spanish) sites.  
 The top mark a site could have scored in terms of accessibility was four. 
However, none of the Web sites performed well in this category, and the top mark 
actually scored was two, by the PKK site, which had both foreign language 
translations and text-only documents for printing. The Hamas and LTTE sites, 
because they did not have foreign language translations, performed very poorly, 
receiving zero points, while the remainder of the sites scored just one point (for 
foreign language facilities). None of the sites were offline during January 2004, the 
period during which the sites were downloaded for study. Gibson and Ward adopt a 
sensible rule of thumb when it comes to the time it takes for a home page to load. 
They say that a home page size greater than 30Kb will mean the page contains 
multiple graphics and will therefore take a long time to load for the average home 
user.36 Just three of the sites investigated had homepages greater than 30Kb. The 
largest of these was the Kach site at 55Kb, followed by the PKK site at 50.5Kb, and 
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lastly the ETA site at 45.5 KB. The FARC homepage at just 1Kb loads instantly,37 as 
do the Hizbollah (6Kb) and Aleph (7Kb) pages.  
If accessibility was not a top priority on any of the sites, navigability was an 
issue that received more attention. The top-scoring site was that maintained by the 
CSRP for Sendero Luminoso. The SL site included a search capacity, navigation tips, 
a home page icon on each page, a menu bar on each page, and a sitemap linked from 
the top page. The NPA site was also easily navigable due to the provision of 
navigation tips, a home page icon on each page, major site area links, and a site map 
linked from the top page. The most difficult sites to navigate were the ETA and Kach 
sites. The ETA site had a menu bar on each page, but no search facility or navigation 
tips, while the Kach site provided a search facility, but no site map or navigational 
tips, which would have increased the user-friendliness of this very large site.38   
 
  
Conclusion 
 
As far back as 1982, Alex Schmid and Janny De Graaf acceded that  
 
If terrorists want to send a message, they should be offered the opportunity to 
do so without them having to bomb and kill. Words are cheaper than lives. 
The public will not be instilled with terror if they see a terrorist speak; they are 
afraid if they see his victims and not himself…If the terrorists believe that they 
have a case, they will be eager to present it to the public. Democratic societies 
should not be afraid of this.39  
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Certainly those who maintained the Web sites analysed here were eager to get their 
views across. But how well did these Web sites deliver the functions postulated at the 
beginning of the chapter? In terms of information provision, the sites were an 
unmitigated success. A majority of the sites contained large volumes of information 
about the groups’ history, heroes, founders, mindsets, and motivations that would be 
difficult for most people to access without the aid of the Internet. If information 
provision was clearly the primary function of the sites, then promotion of participation 
was a close second. This refers not to the recruitment of persons to take part in 
terrorist activities, but the mobilisation of supporters and sympathisers to more 
actively support the terrorists’ causes whether through linking from their own sites to 
the terrorist sites, printing out and pasting-up the posters supplied for download on a 
number of the sites in their local areas, or contacting the groups via the various 
avenues highlighted on the Web sites and getting more directly involved. Funnelling 
money to terrorist groups is also a form of participation, of course. A number of the 
sites analysed sought to raise funds for their activities via their Web sites either 
through directly soliciting donations or offering merchandise for sale. Perhaps the 
least satisfactory aspect of the Web sites analysed, in terms of their postulated 
functions, was the use of the sites for networking purposes. Most of the sites analysed 
were quite centralised and provided little or no links to either sub-groups within the 
organisation or to other, perhaps similar or sympathetic, groups around the globe. 
Having said that, some of the sites were linked to by quite a large number of other 
sites. 
 In terms of delivery, the sites differed quite markedly. A number of the sites 
were quite glitzy and had significant multimedia content, while others were static and 
dull. While a small number of the Web sites were updated regularly, many were 
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updated only intermittently, and two had not been updated for more than a year. Many 
of the sites were available in more than one language, thus giving them a global reach. 
However, the sites scored low on other measures of accessibility, such as the 
availability of text-only documents for printing. Easy navigation was a hallmark of a 
significant number of the sites, which provided search capacities, site maps, 
homepage icons on each page, and major site area links.  
 Two sites stand out in terms of their functioning and effectiveness. These are 
the Kach and NPA sites. The Kach sites, although its design was somewhat amateur, 
delivered very effectively on the functions postulated. It was crammed with 
information and commentary; contained thousands of photographs of the aftermath of 
attacks on Israelis, the funerals of those killed in attacks, etc, all meant to serve as 
evidence of the rightness of the groups ideological position; had an online gaming 
section and numerous other gimmicks, including an online store; and was the only site 
to have a functioning discussion forum. The NPA site, on the other hand, was 
considerably smaller than the Kach site, contained considerably less images, and had 
neither an online store nor a discussion forum. Nonetheless, the NPA site was 
remarkably well designed, both in terms of appearance and navigability, and was 
updated regularly. The site contained large amounts of information about the NPA 
and its activities; had a ‘Culture’ section including musical recordings and poetry; 
contained copies of the group’s newsletter stretching back a number of years; and 
provided numerous ways of contacting the organisation, including the mobile phone 
number of the NPA Press Officer.  
 The FARC site was in marked contrast to the Kach and NPA Web sites. This 
site was amateurish both in its appearance and overall structure. It had not been 
updated for some time, was difficult to navigate, and contained only a small amount 
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of information about the FARC and its activities. (In contrast to the English-language 
pages analysed here, however, the FARC’s Spanish-language site had a professional 
appearance, was regularly updated, chockfull of information, and easily navigated). 
The remainder of the sites analysed met with varying, but generally high, levels of 
success in terms of their functioning and effectiveness.  
What is clear from this analysis is that terrorists are not limiting themselves to 
the traditional means of communication; they increasingly employ the new media to 
pursue their goals. The terrorists of today, like those of yesteryear, are keen to exploit 
the traditional mass media while also recognizing the value of more direct 
communication channels. And, as has been pointed out, “if what matters is openness 
in the marketplace of ideas…then the Web delivers an equal opportunity soapbox.”40  
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